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HABEAS CORPUS: UNRESOLVED
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON MIXED
QUESTIONS FOR STATE
PRISONERS
Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992)
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court held in Wright v. West I that a
state prisoner's conviction based solely on unexplained possession
of stolen goods did not violate his right to due process of law. The
prisoner's petition for habeas corpus was based on insufficient evi-
dence at trial. The Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the
Fourth Circuit 2 and denied the petition. However, in five separate
opinions, the Court failed to set a new standard of review for mixed
questions of law and fact3 in federal habeas corpus cases of state
prisoners . 4
In his plurality opinion, Justice Thomas held that there was suf-
ficient evidence at trial to convict the prisoner.5 Justice Thomas re-
lied on Jackson v. Virginia,6 in which the Court held that a habeas
corpus applicant is entitled to relief if it is found that no rational
trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Thomas opinion initiated the debate over whether a
federal court, when considering habeas corpus petitions from state
prisoners, should give deference to state court determinations of
mixed questions or continue to review mixed questions de novo. 7
1 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992).
2 West v. Wright, 931 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1991).
3 The Supreme Court has defined a mixed question as one asking "whether the rule
of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated." Pullman-Standard v.
Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982). A mixed question presents the decisionmaker
with the task of applying the law to the facts of the case.
4 Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, wrote the
plurality opinion. Justice White, Justice O'Connor (joined by Justice Blackmum and
Justice Stevens), Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter wrote concurring opinions.
5 West, 112 S. Ct. at 2492.
6 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
7 West, 112 S. Ct. at 2491-93. De novo means "afresh; a second time." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990). The Court has referred to the de novo standard of re-
view as "plenary," meaning independent. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963).
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Justice Thomas opined that the de novo review rule is not settled and
that the Court should defer to the state court on mixed questions,
following the recent trend demonstrated in Teague v. Lane" to nar-
row federal court review of state court decisions.9
Justice White found that there was sufficient evidence to convict
the prisoner. He applied the Jackson test but did not join in the stan-
dard of review discussion.' 0
Justice O'Connor, with Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens,
found that there was sufficient evidence to convict the prisoner
based on the Jackson test.'" Justice O'Connor disagreed with Justice
Thomas's analysis of habeas corpus, however, and defended the
Court's decisions, which established federal court de novo review of
mixed questions. 12
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, denying the peti-
tion for habeas corpus, but objected to Justice Thomas's reliance on
Teague as a method of narrowing the review standard since that case
did not establish a new standard of review for mixed questions in
federal habeas corpus cases of state prisoners. 13
Justice Souter agreed with the judgment of the Court. He de-
nied review of the case either de novo or deferentially on the ground
that the petitioner relied on the retroactive application of a new
rule. 14
This Note begins with a brief review of habeas corpus and ex-
amines the standard of review of mixed questions, noting the consti-
tutional law of insufficient evidence claims. Next, the five opinions
of West are considered. Finally, this Note argues that West was an
inappropriate case for the Court to attempt to overturn the standard
of review for mixed questions in habeas corpus and that the under-
lying issues necessary to properly answer the standard of review
question were not fully debated.
II. HABEAS CORPUS BACKGROUND
A. EARLY BOUNDARIES OF THE GREAT WRIT
Habeas corpus is the fundamental safeguard against illegal re-
straint or confinement. 15 The writ became a heritage of English
8 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
9 West, 112 S. Ct. at 2491-93.
10 Id. at 2493 (White, J., concurring).
11 Id. at 2493-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
12 Id (O'Connor, J., concurring).
13 Id at 2498-2500 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
14 Id at 2500-03 (Souter, J., concurring).
15 Habeas corpus is defined as:
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common law and was adopted in the American colonial common law
prior to the Revolution.' 6 The United States Constitution protects
against the suspension of habeas corpus,' 7 and the Judiciary Act of
1789 gave federal courts jurisdiction over those in federal custody
seeking habeas corpus relief within the "principles and usages of
law." 18 Thus, early Supreme Court decisions applied the traditional
common law to form the writ's boundaries.' 9 This meant that a
prisoner could not be granted habeas corpus relief when convicted
by a court of competent jurisdiction. 20 In Exparte Watkins, the Court
reasoned that the writ did not protect individuals from poor judg-
ments but served only to guaranty a trial in a proper court.2 '
During the post-Civil War Reconstruction, both legislative ac-
tion and judicial decree expanded federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion. In 1867, Congress strengthened federal court power in habeas
corpus to include jurisdiction over state prisoners. 22 Additionally,
the Court extended the boundaries of habeas corpus to include re-
view of unconstitutional state laws.2 3 In Ex parte Siebold, the Court
Lat. (You have the body.) The name given to a variety of writs ... having for their
object to bring a party before a court or judge. In common usage, and whenever
these words are used alone, they are usually understood to mean the habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum .... the purpose of which is to test the legality of the detention or
imprisonment; not whether [the prisoner] is guilty or innocent.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed. 1990)
16 See generally WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS
(1980).
17 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 provides that "[t]he privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require It."
18 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81.
19 E.g., Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807) (ChiefJustice Marshall stated
that the meaning of the writ may be found in common law).
20 Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830). In Watkins, the Supreme Court
stated that "[an imprisonment under ajudgment cannot be unlawful, unless that judg-
ment be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity if the Court has general jurisdiction of
the subject, although it should be erroneous." Id. at 202.
21 Id.
22 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(1988)). The Act originally stated:
[T]he several courts of the United States... within their respective jurisdictions, in
addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of
habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty
in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States.
Id., cited in Charles D. Weisselberg, Evidentiary Hearings on Habeas Corpus Cases, 1190
B.Y.U. L. REV. 131, 137 n.26 (1990).
The Act may have been intended to expand habeas corpus beyond deciding compe-
tent jurisdiction to empower courts to decide factual questions. See Max Rosenn, The
Great Writ-A Reflection of Societal Change, 44 OHmO ST. LJ. 337 (1983).
23 Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879). Habeas corpus relief was granted for prison-
ers serving illegal sentences, Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873), and for ille-
gal pretrial judicial decisions, Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
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reasoned that no state court can have jurisdiction over an unconsti-
tutional law.24
Although momentum for broadening the writ's scope was
mounting by the end of the-nineteenth century, habeas corpus still
only applied to convictions under unconstitutional laws. Thus, at
the turn of the century, federal courts did not decide whether pris-
oners' rights had been violated by unfair convictions under constitu-
tional laws. Furthermore, since habeas corpus differed from a direct
appeal, federal courts only reviewed constitutional questions of law
and deferred to the state courts' findings of fact.25
B. MIXED QUESTIONS AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
During the twentieth century, the Court significantly enlarged
the scope of federal habeas corpus. Moore v. Dempsey 26 expanded
habeas corpus review into state court proceedings. 27 The petition-
ers in Moore alleged that their convictions for murder were the result
of a mob-dominated trial, violating their due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment.28 Justice Holmes wrote for the Court:
"[I]t appears to us unavoidable that the District Judge should find
whether the facts alleged are true and whether they can be ex-
plained so far as to leave the state proceeding undisturbed. ' 29 The
Supreme Court remanded the case to the district for a hearing 3°
signaling the Court's willingness for federal courts to engage in an
independent determination of the facts.5 '
Although this case signaled a change in the Court's review of
state court determinations, in Brown v. Allen,3 2 the Court explicitly
24 Siebold, 100 U.S. at 376-77.
25 See generally Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963).
26 261 U.S. 86 (1923). The petitioners in Moore were convicted by an Arkansas trial
court for a murder that occurred during a racial disturbance. The trial only lasted forty-
five minutes and defense counsel never consulted the defendants nor called any wit-
nesses. Id. at 86-89. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Id. at 91.
After the district court dismissed the habeas corpus petitions, the Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the district court for a hearing of the facts surrounding the judicial
corrective process. Id.
27 Expansion in the jurisdiction of federal habeas courts can best be seen by examin-
ing the scope of issues cognizable under the writ. See Note, Developments in the Law-
Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1040, 1055-61 (1970).
28 Moore, 261 U.S. at 87.
29 Id. at 92.
30 Id.
31 See Charles D. Weisselberg, Evidentiary Hearings in Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REv. 131, 140-43 (1990).
32 344 U.S. 443 (1953). In Brown, a convicted felon who had been sentenced to
death in North Carolina, filed an application for habeas corpus in the federal district
1993]
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empowered federal courts to review factual issues de novo and man-
dated that federal courts make their own mixed question determina-
tions without deference to state court findings. In Brown, the Court
discussed what weight should be given state court adjudications in
habeas corpus cases.33 Justice Reed's majority opinion answered
the question generally:
[W]here there is material conflict of fact in the transcripts of evidence
as to deprivation of constitutional rights, the District Court may prop-
erly depend upon the state's resolution of the issue ... In other cir-
cumstances the state adjudication carries the weight that federal
practice gives to the conclusion of a court of last resort of another
jurisdiction on federal constitutional issues. It is not resjudicata.34
Thus, the Court confirmed that a federal court can review state
court factual determinations.
More specifically, Brown provided a flexible rule for federal dis-
trictjudges in choosing the appropriate standard of review for pure
factual questions. 35 State court findings of fact deserved deference
unless a "vital flaw" was found.36 To find flaws, the district court
must carefully examine the record.3 7 If no record exists, if it is inad-
equate, or if a "vital flaw" appears on the record, the district court
may re-hear the case to determine its factual merits.38
In Justice Frankfurter's separate but unanimously supported
opinion, Brown also established the standard of review for mixed
questions as follows:
[T]he District Judge must exercise his own judgment on this blend of
facts and their legal values. Thus, so-called mixed questions or the
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found leave the
duty of adjudication with the federal judge .... Although there is no
need for the federal judge, if he could, to shut his eyes to the State
consideration of such issues, no binding right is to be attached to the
State determination.3 9
Thus, the Court ruled that a federal judge must make a de novo re-
view of mixed questions, and in doing so, may review the state court
court, alleging that his due process rights had been violated by an unfair jury selection.
The North Carolina courts selected jurors using property tax lists which Brown alleged
resulted in jury panels with disproportionately fewer African-Americans than whites.
The Supreme Court dismissed the habeas corpus petition, holding that no systematic
discrimination had been shown. Id.
33 Id. at 458.
34 Id. (citation omitted).




39 Id. at 507-08 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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determination.40 While a de novo review of the factual portion of the
issue might not have been necessary, the judge was required to
make a fresh and independent application of the federal law to the
facts. 41 The Court reasoned that this expansion of habeas corpus
was justified because "[t]he state court cannot have the last say when
it, though on fair consideration and what procedurally may be
deemed fairness, may have misconceived a federal constitutional
right." 42 This de novo review procedure was quickly followed in the
lower courts43 and later clarified in Townsend v. Sain,44 in which the
Court again announced that the district court must make its own
application of federal law to state factual findings.45
In the past twenty years and beginning with Stone v. Powell,46 in
which the Court held that the use at trial of illegally obtained evi-
dence did not afford habeas corpus protection, the Court has
stopped the expansion of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. 47
However, the Brown framework for the standard of review has re-
mained fully intact.48 As recently as 1985, the Court reiterated that
a mixed question in a habeas corpus proceeding is subject to a de
40 Id. at 507 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
41 Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
42 Id. at 508 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
43 See United States ex reL Leyra v. Denno, 208 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'd on other
grounds, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.
1953); Clark v. Warden Maryland Penitentiary, 293 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1961); Ellis v.
Ellisor, 239 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1956); Sims v. Alvis, 242 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1957); Wig-
gins v. Ragen, 238 F.2d 309 (7th Cir. 1956); Torrence v. Looney, 233 F.2d 715 (10th
Cir. 1956).
44 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
45 Id. at 318.
46 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
47 See Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (state court-barred constitutional claims
are not reviewable in a federal habeas court without a showing of actual prejudice); Sum-
ner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (198 1) (presumption that state court factual determinations on
the merits are correct); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (federal habeas court cannot
review a petition which contains exhausted and non-exhausted claims); Harris v. Reed,
489 U.S. 255 (1989) (federal habeas court cannot review a claim which was procedurally
barred in a state court without a showing of prejudice and actual innocence); Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (federal habeas court cannot review a claim that relies on a
new rule).
Two important law review articles may have provided the underlying rationale for
this trend: 1) Bator, supra note 22 (collateral review of state decisions should be limited
to assuring the adequacy of state process); and 2) Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrele-
vant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CH. L. REv. 142 (1970) (habeas claims
should be reserved for cases in which there is a possibility of an innocent prisoner
wrongly convicted, not just for procedural details which interfere with justice).
48 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985) (voluntariness of a confession is not an issue
of fact entitled to deferential review; rather, it is a legal question meriting independent
consideration in a federal habeas corpus proceeding).
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novo federal review.49
C. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE CLAIMS IN HABEAS CORPUS
Habeas corpus relief may be granted to a state prisoner held
"in custody in violation of the Constitution. ' 50 The Supreme Court
has long held that the Constitution requires proof beyond reason-
able doubt for conviction in criminal cases. 5 1 More particularly, the
Court determined in Jackson v. Virginia that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a person is con-
victed without "sufficient proof."52
InJackson, a convicted murderer contended that insufficient evi-
dence existed at his trial to prove that he had the requisite specific
intent to kill. 53 The Supreme Court denied habeas corpus relief af-
ter a thorough review of the record.54 The Court held that in a
habeas corpus proceeding arising from a due process claim in which
a state court has convicted a prisoner with insufficient evidence, a
federal court must consider "whether there is sufficient evidence to
justify a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt." 55 Thus, prisoners challenging state court convictions were
entitled to relief only when the evidence at trial was such that no
rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.56 Prior to West, federal courts applied this test inde-
pendently (de novo) and without deference to the results of the state
courts' application of the test.57
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Between December 13, 1978, and December 26, 1978, Angelo
Cardova's vacation home in Westmoreland County, Virginia, was
burglarized. 58 Cardova reported as stolen belongings worth ap-
49 Id. at 112. The majority opinion was joined by seven other justices.
50 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1988).
51 See Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881); Brinegarv. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 174 (1949); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 361-67 (1970).
52 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979).
53 Id. at 311.
54 Id. at 326.
55 Id. at 324.
56 Id.
57 See Palmariello v. Superintendent of M.C.I. Norfolk, 873 F.2d 491 (1st Cir. 1989);
Liberta v. Kelly, 839 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1988); Evans v. Ct. of Common Pleas, 959 F.2d
1227 (3d Cir. 1992); Resnover v. Pearson, 965 F.2d 1453 (7th Cir. 1992); Denham v.
Deeds, 954 F.2d 1501 (9th Cir. 1991); Cordoba v. Hanrahan, 910 F.2d 691 (10th Cir.
1990); Stokes v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992).
58 Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2484 (1992).
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proximately $3,500. 59 On January 10, 1979, sheriff's officers
searched Frank West's home in Gloucester County, Virginia, and
seized items they believed were stolen from Cardova's home.60
Cardova later identified the items seized by police, estimating their
value at $1,100.61
West pled not guilty to a charge of grand larceny pursuant to
Virginia Code § 18.2-95.62 At trial, the prosecution presented six
witnesses who testified about the timing of the theft, the ownership
of the property, the value of the property and the chain of custody
of the property after it was seized from West's home.63
West denied the theft and testified that he had purchased the
items at flea markets, which he attended regularly.64 West also testi-
fied that he remembered buying some of the items from an acquain-
tance, Ronnie Elkins, but his testimony surrounding Elkins was
confused and incomplete.65 Elkins did not testify at West's trial. 66
The prosecution presented no rebuttal evidence. 67 Virginia law
permitted an inference that a person who fails to explain, or falsely
explains, exclusive possession of recently stolen property is guilty of
theft.6 18 West was convicted and received a ten-year prison sen-
59 Id.
60 Brief for the Respondent at 1, Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992)(No. 91-
542)[hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
61 Brief for Petitioners at 4, Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992) (No. 91-542)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioners]. Among the items stolen from Cardova and later
seized from West: two television sets, a sleeping bag, a shell-framed mirror, a coffee
table, a ball-shaped hardwood carving, a synthetic-fiber fur coat with the name "Esther"
embroidered in the lining, a box of flatware, a mounted lobster, a silkjacket with "Korea
1970" embroidered on the outside, and a record player. Id.
62 The felonious taking, stealing and carrying away of property with a value of $100
or more is a violation of VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-95 (Repl. Vol. 1975). West v. Wright, 931




66 Brief for Respondent, supra note 60, at 3. West testified that he did not call Elkins
as a witness since West was not aware until trial that he was being charged with stealing
the property he bough from Elkins. He was incarcerated when the stolen property was
seized by police from his house and the indictment did not specify the items that were
taken from Cardova. Id.
67 Brief for Respondent, supra note 60, at 3.
68 Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2485 (1992). The trial court instructed the
jurors:
If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that property of value
of$ 100.00 or more was stolen from Angelo Cardova, and that it was recently there-
after found in the exclusive and personal possession of the defendant, and that such
possession has been unexplained or falsely denied by the defendant, then such pos-
session is sufficient to raise an inference that the defendant was the thief; and if such
inference, taking into consideration the whole evidence, leads you to believe be-
1993] 985
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tence. 69 The Supreme Court of Virginia denied West's appeal,
which raised several issues including whether the evidence at trial
was sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.70
In 1987, West filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Virginia
Supreme Court but his petition was summarily denied in May
1988. 71 West then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 225472 in the Federal District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia. 73 United States District Judge James R. Spencer
applied the constitutional standard established in Jackson v. Virginia
and denied relief, finding that "there was sufficient evidence upon
which a rational trier of fact could find West guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt."'74
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit re-
versed, ruling that West's due process rights were indeed violated
since there was insufficient evidence under the Jackson test.7 5 The
Fourth Circuit relied heavily on Cosby v. Jones,76 in which the Elev-
enth Circuit collaterally reviewed a state burglary conviction that
was based solely on the inference of possession, as in West's case. 77
In Cosby, the court utilized five contextual factors in applying the
Jackson sufficiency of evidence test and held that the prisoner's due
process rights had been violated. 78 A rehearing of West was denied
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the theft, then you shall find
the defendant guilty.
Id. n.2.
69 Id. at 2485.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Habeas corpus relief on a claim of insufficient evidence is grounded in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(a) (1988), which provides that:
The Supreme Court, ajustice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall enter-
tain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
73 Wright, 112 S. Ct. at 2485.
74 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 61, at 4. Judge Spencer specifically noted West's
attempt to explain his possession of the stolen goods but concluded that "it is clear from
the evidence that the defendant was found in possession of recently stolen property, and
that the jury did not believe his explanation." Id.
75 West v. Wright, 931 F.2d 262, 270 (4th Cir. 1991).
76 682 F.2d 1373 (11 th Cir. 1982).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1382-83. The Eleventh Circuit refined the Jackson test for convictions based
on unexplained possession of recently stolen property by asking five questions: 1) Was
the possession recent in relation to the type of crime? 2) With what percentage of the
stolen property was the defendant found? 3) Was there an attempt to conceal the prop-
erty? 4) Was the explanation given by the defendant plausible? and 5) Was there evi-
dence to support the defendant's explanation? Id.
986 [Vol. 83
HABEAS CORPUS
by the Court of Appeals. 79
On December 16, 1991, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari.80 In an unusual step, the Court amended the grant for certio-
rari two days later, stating:
In addition to the questions presented by the petition, the parties are
requested to brief and argue the following question: In determining
whether to grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, should a federal
court give deference to the state court's application of law to the spe-
cific facts of the petitioner's case or should it review the state court's
determination de novo ?81
This novel way of raising the issue suggested that some members of
the Court were poised to abandon the de novo review standard of
state court mixed question determinations.
IV. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Fourth Circuit
decision and denied West's habeas corpus petition.8 2 However, the
Court's five separate opinions reveal its disagreement as to the
proper means of arriving at the judgment. Since no majority opin-
ion exists, the standard of review to be used by federal courts in
determining mixed questions arising out of state petitions for
habeas corpus was left unresolved.
A. THE PLURALITY OPINION
Justice Thomas announced the judgment of the Court.83 The
Court unanimously held that "there was more than enough evi-
dence to support West's conviction." 84 Prior to announcing the
judgment, however, Justice Thomas initiated a debate over what
standard of review should be used in deciding mixed questions in
habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners.
Justice Thomas first emphasized the writ's narrow applicability
in the early years of the United States and its gradual expansion
since that time.8 5 According to Justice Thomas, Brown v. Allen 86 sig-
79 Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2486 (1992).
80 Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 656 (1991).
81 Id. at 672.
82 West, 112 S. Ct. at 2482.
83 Id at 2484. ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas.
84 Id at 2492.
85 Id. at 2486. Justice Thomas opined that prior to 1953, habeas corpus would not
lie for a state prisoner if he had been given an opportunity to obtain full and fair consid-
eration of his claim. Id (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 459-
60 (1963)). Justice Thomas also quoted Justice Powell. Id
1993] 987
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
naled a landmark decision, in which the principle of absolute defer-
ence was first rejected.8 7 As Justice Thomas interpreted the case,
however, Brown merely gave federal courts the ability to ignore state
court findings of mixed questions; it did not completely thwart def-
erential treatment since a federal judge could still choose to rely on
the state court's findings.88 Therefore, according to Justice
Thomas, the standard to be used after Brown was unresolved since
deferential treatment, although no longer absolute, could still be in-
voked at the federal judge's discretion.8 9
After reviewing the case law post-Brown through Miller v. Fen-
ton,90 Justice Thomas found that the Court never explicitly consid-
ered whether the standard of review should be de novo or deferential
for mixed questions. 9' He opined that the Court, although never
technically resolving the question, "gradually [came] to treat as set-
tled the rule that mixed constitutional questions are 'subject to ple-
nary federal review' on habeas." 92 Therefore, the use of plenary or
de novo review for habeas corpus courts deciding mixed questions
was merely fortuitous and lacked formal foundation.
According to Justice Thomas, Jackson v. Virginia 93 contributed
to the fortuious use of a de novo standard of review.94 Justice
Thomas also argued that the Jackson Court confused the issue by
first stating that state courts' judgments were entitled to deference
but indicating later that the Jackson rule itself should be applied in-
depedently by the federal court.95
Justice Thomas then attacked the practice of de novo review of
mixed questions. He wrote, "Despite our apparent adherence to a
standard of de novo habeas review with respect to mixed constitu-
tional questions, we have implicitly questioned that standard, at
least with respect to pure legal questions, in our recent retroactivity
precedents." 96 Justice Thomas referred explicitly to Teague v.
86 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
87 West, 112 S. Ct. at 2487.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 2488.
90 474 U.S. 104 (1985). See supra note 48.
91 West, 112 S. Ct. at 2488.
92 Id. at 2489 (quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 112). Justice Thomas cited the subsequent
cases he examined: Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1961); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717 (1961). West, 112 S. Ct. at 2488.
93 443 U.S. 307 (1979).





Lane,97 in which the Court held that a habeas corpus petitioner can-
not rely on a "new rule" of criminal procedure announced after his
conviction became final on direct appeal.98 Justice Thomas argued
that Teague and other recent retroactivity cases99 stood for deferen-
tial treatment of pure legal questions and were premised on a new,
more limited, view of the nature and function of the writ of habeas
corpus. 00 Justice Thomas reasoned that habeas corpus was not
designed to substitute for direct review and that its use should be
balanced with the states' interest in finality.' 0 After preparing for
an assault on the de novo review standard, Justice Thomas threw a
white feather to his opponents and merely concluded that "such far-
reaching issues" need not be decided in West.' 0 2
B. JUSTICE WHITE'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice White's one-sentence opinion avoided engaging in the
standard of review discussion that Justice Thomas cultivated. He
simply stated that there was sufficient evidence to support West's
conviction under theJackson standard03
C. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment but disagreed
with Justice Thomas's habeas corpus discussion.' 0 4  Justice
O'Connor listed nine errors in Justice Thomas's opinion.
In her first two objections, Justice O'Connor attacked Justice
Thomas's description of the pre-1953 law of habeas corpus, prefer-
ring a broader historical interpretation of the writ.' 0 5 She explained
that the early limit of habeas corpus to jurisdictional questions re-
sulted from the limited constitutional protection perceived prior to
the turn of the twentieth century.' 0 6 Justice O'Connor also found
fault with Justice Thomas's use of Justice Powell's quotation sup-
97 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
98 IL- at 310.
99 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407
(1990).
100 West, 112 S. Ct. at 2490.
101 Id. at 2490.
102 Id. at 2492.
103 Id. at 2493 (White, J., concurring).
104 Id at 2493-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined
Justice O'Connor.
105 IL- (O'Connor, J., concurring).
106 Id. at 2493 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "The only protections the Constitution
afforded to state prisoners were those for which the text of the Constitution explicitly
limited the authority of the States, most notably the Due Process Clause .... [which] was
understood to guarantee no more than a full and fair hearing in the state courts." I&£
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porting the premise that prior to 1953, federal courts gave absolute
deference to state court findings. According to Justice O'Connor,
Justice Powell referred to "absolute respect" which is not the same
as stating that state court judgments were entitled to complete
deference. 107
Justice O'Connor's next two objections to Justice Thomas's
opinion related to the interpretation of Brown v. Allen.108 According
to Justice O'Connor, Brown was not the first case in which the doc-
trine of complete deference was not followed. 10 9 Justice O'Connor
then argued that Justice Thomas also understated "the certainty
with which Brown v. Allen rejected a deferential standard of review of
issues of law." 110 Here, Justice O'Connor stated that Brown only
discussed the possibility of deferential treatment in passages dedi-
cated to the standard of review used in determining pure questions
of fact.111 More importantly, Justice O'Connor noted that the Brown
Court gave a de novo review to Brown's case "without any hint of
deference to the state courts." 112
Justice O'Connor next found error in Justice Thomas's state-
ment that the Court has never considered which standard of review
to apply to mixed questions in a federal habeas corpus court. 1 3 In
addition to the cases listed by Justice Thomas as cases in which the
Court allegedly adhered to the rule without foundation, Justice
O'Connor cited twenty-one other cases in which de novo review was
discussed and explicitly chosen." 4
107 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
108 Id. at 2494 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
109 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor cited Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S.
224 (1924), Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902), and Exparte Spencer, 265 U.S.
652 (1913).
Justice Thomas addressed Salinger in a footnote:
Salinger, however, involved the degree of preclusive effect of a habeas judgment
upon subsequent habeas petitions filed by a federal prisoner. This case, of course,
involves the degree of preclusive effect of a criminal conviction upon an initial
habeas petition filed by a state prisoner. We cannot fault ourselves for limiting our
focus to the latter context.
Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2487 n.3.
110 West, 112 S. Ct. at 2494 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
112 Id. at 2495 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
113 Id. (O'Connor,J., concurring).
114 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor cited United States ex rel. Leyra
v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558-61 (1954); United States ex rel. Jennings v. Ragen, 358 U.S.
276, 277 (1959); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 546 (1961); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1966); Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349-63 (1966); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766-74
(1970); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522-36 (1972); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477,
482-90 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-90 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778, 781-91 (1973); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222-49 (1973);
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Justice O'Connor's next point of contention pertained to Jus-
tice Thomas's description ofJackson v. Virginia as adding to the con-
fusion sorrounding the standard of review issue.115 Justice
O'Connor argued that the Jackson Court did not add to any alleged
confusion over the standard of review to be used. The Court simply
"adhered the general rule of de novo review of constitutional claims
on habeas."' 1 6
According to Justice O'Connor, Justice Thomas also mis-
characterized Teague v. Lane.' 17 Stated simply, Justice O'Connor ar-
gued, Teague was not a case where the standard of review was
discussed; it was a case about retroactivity.118 The case, therefore,
did not stand for the proposition that the standard of review should
be redesigned.
Justice O'Connor then refuted Justice Thomas's suggestion that
de novo review is incompatible with the maxim that federal courts
should "give great weight to the considered conclusions of a coe-
qual state judiciary."' 1 9 ForJustice O'Connor, this maxim does not
paralyze federal courts in acting on state courts' legal conclusions.
Federal courts "have an independent obligation to say what the law
is."120
Finally, Justice O'Connor noted that Congress, on thirteen oc-
casions since Brown, has refused to adopt habeas corpus legislation
that would provide a deferential standard of review in the face of the
judicial precedent of de novo review. 121 Thus, argued Justice
O'Connor, such legislative refusals to correct the judicially estab-
lished precedent supported her argument that the precedent favor-
ing de novo review is appropriate.1 22
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 109-17 (1977); Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341,
345-49 (1981);Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 750-54 (1983); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 435-42 (1984); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,420-34 (1986); Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 383-87 (1986); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 360-65
(1988); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 201-05 (1989); Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct.
475, 480-81 (1991).
115 West, 112 S. Ct. at 2496 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307 (1979)).
116 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring)(citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).
118 Id. Justice O'Connor referred here to Justice Kennedy's assertion that the evalua-
tion of whether a rule is "new" is not the same as deference. Id. at 2498-2500 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
119 Id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112
(1985)).
120 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
121 Id (O'Connor, J., concurring).
122 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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D. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Kennedy agreed that sufficient evidence existed to con-
vince a rational trier of fact that West was guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt.123 In his separate opinion, Justice Kennedy did not
engage in the debate over the proper historical interpretation of
habeas, noting that the "real issue dividing [his] colleagues [was]
whether the retroactivity analysis of Teague casts doubt upon the
rule of Miller v. Fenton."'124 Specifically, did Teague overrule the pre-
cedent expressly affirmed in Miller that mixed questions require de
novo review for habeas corpus claims?
For Justice Kennedy, Teague did not create any conflict with the
de novo requirement and actually supported such a principle. 125
Moreover, Teague did not establish any necessity to defer to state
court determinations; it instead established a new retroactivity prin-
ciple. 126 Justice Kennedy noted that in order to distinguish between
old rules and new rules, the federal court must interpret existing
precedents, suggesting in one sense a deference to state courts.' 27
But the purpose for a Teague inquiry is to "determine whether appli-
cation of a new rule would upset a conviction that was obtained in
accordance with the constitutional interpretations existing at the
time of the prisoner's conviction."' 128 That purpose is not frustrated
by a de novo review since the claim must first pass the retroactivity
threshold before being considered in a habeas corpus review. Jus-
tice Kennedy stated: "With this safeguard in place, recognizing the
importance of finality, de novo review can be exercised within its
proper sphere."i 29 In Justice Kennedy's view, the instant case
passed the retroactivity threshold, but did not pass the Jackson
threshold upon de novo review.
E. JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Souter rejected West's petition without using the Jackson
123 Id. at 2500 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
124 Id. at 2498 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
125 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
126 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
128 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy quoted Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct.
1130, 1135 (1992), for the explanation that when a petitioner seeks federal habeas relief
based upon a principle announced after a final judgment, Teague and its progeny require
an answer to two questions: 1) whether the decision relied on a new rule, and if not 2)
whether granting the relief sought would create a new rule because it extends the old
rule to new ground. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2498-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
129 Id. at 2500 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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standard. 30 His discussion was limited to the application of the
Teague retroactivity test to West's habeas corpus claim.13' First,Jus-
tice Souter determined that the rule relied on by the court of ap-
peals in granting West relief was not completely developed in
Jackson.'3 2 Second, he found the specific rule relied on by the court
of appeals failed the Teague test.'3 3
Although the Fourth Circuit suggested that it was using the
Jackson standard to determine whether West's conviction was rea-
sonable, it actually refined the test with the Cosby v. Jones 134 analy-
sis. 13 5 Based on the five guideposts established in Cosby, the court of
appeals reversed the conviction.' 3 6 Since Cosby was decided after
West's conviction, it was a "new rule" pursuant to the Teague retro-
activity test.'3 7 Therefore, no court could apply Cosby to West's
facts even though that rule afforded West habeas corpus relief. Jus-
tice Souter concluded that the Fourth Circuit's decision should be
reversed in light of Teague.
V. ANALYSIS
The Court correctly decided West. West possessed recently sto-
len property and the jury did not believe his confused and incom-
plete explanation. Under Virginia law, a jury could find guilt based
solely on the inference made from unexplained possession of stolen
goods.' 38 The Court found that "there [was] sufficient evidence to
justify a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt."'1 9 To afford West relief, the Fourth Circuit refined the
Court's insufficient evidence test by using a new rule.' 40 Since a
habeas petitioner cannot rely on the retroactive application of a new
rule to gain relief,'4 ' the Fourth Circuit erred.
More importantly, the Court in West exhibited division over
which standard of review was proper. The Court opened the stan-
dard of review question even though it had not been raised by either
party. This Note argues that West was an inappropriate case to de-
130 Id. (Souter. J., concurring).
131 Id. at 2502 (Souter,J., concurring).
132 Id. at 2502 (Souter,J., concurring).
133 Id (Souter, J., concurring).
134 682 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982). See supra note 78.
135 West, 112 S. Ct. at 2502 (Souter, J., concurring).
136 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
137 Id (Souter, J., concurring).
138 Id. at 2485.
139 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979).
140 Wright v. West, 931 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1991).
141 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
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cide the standard of review question, which resulted in an incom-
plete debate of the underlying issues. Thus, West merely represents
the Court's irresolution on the mixed question debate and foreshad-
ows the possible abandonment of the de novo standard.
A. POOR FACTS/POOR LAW
For two reasons, West was an inappropriate case to use as a ba-
sis for attempting to establish a new standard of review for mixed
questions in habeas corpus cases. First, the facts in West were not
favorable for discussing the differences between deferential and de
novo standards of review. Since either standard of review produced
the same result, the standard of review issue was irrelevent. Second,
the test established in Jackson for insufficient evidence claims already
gave deference to the state finding. 1 42 Thus, applying the test with a
deferential standard of review was unnecessary.
1. The Facts
Justice Thomas concluded that "the claim advanced by the
habeas petitioner must fail even assuming that the state court's re-
jection of it should be reconsidered de novo. '" 143 Therefore,
whatever standard was deemed appropriate for West's claim, he
should not have been granted relief. The facts in West did not pro-
vide a basis to debate the important aspects of the proper standard
of review since the different standards of review were not determi-
native. In essence, the standard of review was irrelevant.
A more appropriate case would be one in which a deferential
review by a federal court would deny a prisoner relief but a de novo
review would grant him freedom. For example, if the state court
made a reasonable but flawed application of constitutional law to
the facts, a genuine dilemma would arise as to which standard of
review to use. Using a de novo standard of review, a federal court
would correct the error. A federal court deferring to the state court
would uphold the conviction.
Three of the Justices' opinions recognized that West was a poor
case for determining the standard of review. Justice Thomas con-
cluded that the far-reaching issues raised by the standard of review
question did not need to be decided in West. 144 Justice Souter re-
versed on other grounds, noting that the standard of review ques-
142 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979).




tion should not be reached.1 45 Finally, Justice White's silence on
the standard of review issue suggested that he, too, found the West
facts ill-suited for the standard of review question. 146
2. The Law
Jackson v. Virginia established the constitutional law applicable
to West's claim. 147 In that case, Justice Stewart held that an "appli-
cant is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the
record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could
have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."'148 There-
fore, under the Jackson test, federal courts are to determine the rea-
sonableness of state court convictions. The Jackson standard "gives
full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve con-
flicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reason-
able inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts."' 149 Thus, the
Jackson test built deference into the law of insufficient evidence
claims.
Since the Jackson Court established the insufficient evidence test
with deference to state courts, application of that test with a defer-
ential standard of review would be repetitive and unnecessary. Us-
ing a deferential standard of review for an insufficient evidence
claim, the federal court would ask whether the state appellate court
could have reasonably determined that a reasonable juror could have
found proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This repetition of rea-
sonableness is unnecessary because the Jackson test already required
the federal judge to defer to the state conviction. State convictions
of prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief in federal courts were al-
ready insulated from federal protection.
B. THE BALANCE OF STATE AND FEDERAL INTERESTS
Because West did not require the Court to solve the standard of
review question, an incomplete debate resulted. Justice Thomas ad-
mitted that balancing the federal interest in ensuring constitutional
fairness in state courts with the states' interests injustice and finality
was necessary to solve the standard of review question. 150 States'
145 Id. at 2500 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter stated that since the merits of
West's case should not have been addressed under any standard, it was a poor case to
decide the proper standard of review. Id.
146 Id. at 2493 (White, J., concurring).
147 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
148 Id- at 324.
149 Id. at 319.
150 West, 112 S. Ct. at 2491.
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interests in both the finality of concluded litigation and the right to
punish support any limitation of habeas corpus in federal courts.
Assuming that a fundamental requirement of the criminal justice
system is fairness, delays in implementing penalties on state prison-
ers frustrate this fairness and ultimately, justice. This argument is
sometimes combined with the argument that the volume of habeas
corpus cases reviewed by federal courts has put an unwarranted
strain on the federal justice system, especially in capital cases.' 51
These interests must be weighed against what Justice O'Connor
found to be the federal courts' obligation to determine constitu-
tional law. 152
Federal courts set the boundaries of constitutional protection
by deciding cases requiring mixed question determinations. More-
over, many constitutional protections now recognized in federal
habeas corpus courts only arise in the form of a mixed question.
They include claims concerning insufficient evidence, 153 a defense
counsel's conflict of interest, 154 the constitutionality of pretrial iden-
tification procedures, 155 the voluntariness of a guilty plea, 156 the ef-
fectiveness of defense counsel' 57 and the constitutionality of
involuntary confessions. 158 A deferential standard of review would
not test whether state courts' decided these cases properly, but only
whether state courts' decided them reasonably. Federal courts,
however, have an interest in determining constitutional law, not
merely in reviewing the state conclusions for reasonableness. For
"[t]he state court cannot have the last say when it ...may have
misconceived a federal constitutional right."' 159 This reasoning is
based on the Supremacy Clause. 160 Although Justice O'Connor de-
fended a federal duty to decide constitutional law, the Court in West
ultimately did not balance the federal and state interests.
151 See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, AD Hoc CoMMrrrEE ON
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES (1989).
152 West, 112 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor noted that
although federal courts should give weight to state conclusions, this does not mean that
"federal courts must presume the correctness of a state court's legal conclusions on
habeas, or that a state court's incorrect legal determination has ever been allowed to
stand because it was reasonable. We have always held that federal courts, even on
habeas, have an independent obligation to say what the law is." Id.
153 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
154 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
155 Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 509 (1982).
156 Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983).
157 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
158 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
159 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 508 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
160 Id. at 510 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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V. CONCLUSION
In West, the Supreme Court created a question which was not
raised by either party. The Court asked the parties to brief the
question of whether a federal court should give deference to the
state court's application of law to the specific facts in habeas corpus
petitions. In questioning the de novo standard of review precedent,
Justice Thomas began a battle the Court did not finish. This indeci-
siveness in the Supreme Court serves as a warning of the possible
abandonment of the de novo review standard.
JAMES BASTA
